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I. INTRODUCTION
Rising public interest in consumer problems inevitably focuses attention on
the Federal Trade Commission. It seems the natural leader of the attack
against consumer deception since the Commission is the one agency which
already has considerable power to eliminate the causes of consumer deception.
In addition to its attention-getting abilities and extensive rights of investiga-
tion, the FTC is empowered to enjoin unfair and deceptive trade practices in-
cluding false or misleading advertising.1
But after even a brief perusal of the Commission's activities in the consumer
protection arena, the observer is likely to become discouraged as to the capa-
bility of this agency to protect consumers. The effect of its performance seems
negligible, for deceptive practices appear to be multiplying' and limitations
on the Commission's capacity seem to outweigh its powers. For example, the
"in commerce" limitation on FTC jurisdiction has been viewed as a restric-
tion on the Commission's power to prosecute local merchants using deceptive
practices outside the District of Columbia, although some forward movement
is discernible.' Even where it has jurisdiction, the Commission has not pressed
its false advertising program with particular vigor, relying more on complaints
of competitors than on preplanned enforcement programs following up in-
depth analyses of consumer needs.' On the other hand, recent FTC hearings,
reports, and pilot projects on consumer problems suggest that a different ap-
proach may be on the horizon.'
Despite recent charges, the most significant obstacle to FTC prevention and
prosecution of consumer deception through false advertising is probably not a
* Associate Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1956, LL.B. 1962, University of Minnesota. The
assistance of R. Allan Horning, now a third-year student at the Duke University School of Law, and the
support of the Duke Endowment in the preparation of this article are gratefully acknowledged.
1 "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce,
are hereby declared unlawful." 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. S 45(a)(1) (1964), amending 38 Stat.
719 (1914).
'See generally, e.g., W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE (1968); D.
CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES (1963). See also E.
Cox, B. FELLMUTH, J. SCHULZ, THE CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969).
On the other hand, we may just be more aware of such practices. For a more sanguine appraisal of
FTC performance, but limited to false advertising cases, see, e.g., Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the
Federal Trade Commission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548 (1964). The impact of FTC
activity is, of course, impossible to quantify on the basis of available data. Developments in the Law-
Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1005, 1097 (1967).
' Compare FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941), with Bankers Securities Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d
403 (3d Cir. 1961).
'See H.R. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1951); Gimbel Bros., 60 F.T.C. 359, 375 (1962) (dis-
senting opinion).
' See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Notice o1 Hearings on National Consumer Protection and
Education, 33 FED. REC. 15232 (1968); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT
CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILORS (1968); FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION, REPORT ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAM (1968), the latter two
are summarized in 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,194, 50,205 (1968).
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lack of prosecutorial vigor. Rather, it is procedural prcblems that plague the
Commission.' Lacking preliminary injunctive powers except in the case of
false food and drug advertisements-itself an unused power-the FTC is im-
potent to prevent deceptive practices until after trial -.ind administrative ap-
peals. Respondents freely rely upon procedural devices such as the Commis-
sion's willingness to entertain interlocutory appeals orn an almost automatic
basis to delay and postpone such cases endlessly. Two o three years is not an
uncommon period between complaint and issuance of a cease and desist order;
more than a decade is not unheard of. In recent years ihe FTC has expanded
voluntary compliance, advisory opinion, and similar programs; but these pro-
vide scant protection against the persistent, recalcitrant firm. Unless the FTC
can prosecute the hard-liners effectively and swiftly, it :an hardly expect their
competitors to cooperate and willingly place themselves at a significant dis-
advantage.
The FTC will not become an effective force in the ai ea of consumer protec-
tion until its procedural problems are faced and resolved. Many suggestions
have been made. Commissioner Elman has recommended that federal district
attorneys be empowered to prosecute routine consumer deception cases, leaving
the Commission free to develop the law in significani test cases.' Although
this suggestion deserves to be explored carefully, its current prospects for adop-
tion seem slim. In the last session of Congress, the S(:nate passed legislation
giving the FTC preliminary injunctive powers upon opplication to a federal
district court in consumer deception cases; but the Hou;;e failed to act and this
proposal must now be approved by both houses in the 91st session if it is to
become law.' While not to be decried, consideration still needs to be given to
whether this suggestion is really too meek. Why not, for example, give the
FTC power to issue a preliminary injunction in consumer fraud cases subject
to court review? After probable cause has been found by the Commission and
substantial public harm is likely, it does not seem an u afair burden to require
the respondent to show cause why an injunction should not issue in a consumer
deception case.' Interpretations of the "in commerce" limitation on the FTC
seem ripe for considerable expansion." Other possib ilities also need to be
considered. For example, an earlier suggestion that violations of section 5
create civil remedies needs implementation." The FTC might experiment
with summary administrative procedures for trying consumer deception cases
as an alternative to the injunction remedy or as a solution for the problem of
prosecuting routine cases. Despite the current judicial popularity of expanding
rights to hearing and opportunities to be heard, neither "due process" nor
'Many of these problems are summarized in Developments in Law--Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 1005, 1063-96 (1967).
'Elman, Antitrust Enforcement: Retrospect and Prospect, 53 A.B.A.J. 6C9 (1967).
'See S. 3065, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
'But cf. Milistein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advert'sing, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 439,
493 n.263 (1964).
'0 Id. at 456-57; G. ALEXANDER, HONESTY AND CoMPETITION 3-4 (1967).
" See Bunn, National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. REv. 98' (1949).
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common sense requires a full trial-type hearing in every case. The develop-
ment of less time-consuming but fair procedures in false advertising cases is
an immediate need." As an adjunct to voluntary compliance programs the
Commission should develop standards for fair consumer contract practices,
authorizing equitable merchants to advertise the fairness of their practices. 3
Just as automobile manufacturers are finally starting a race to safety, so should
merchants be encouraged to compete in the honesty of their sales.
Experimentation should become the hallmark of FTC action. As one
suggestion in this regard, this article examines the problem of proof of
consumer deception in FTC false advertising cases and suggest as an alterna-
tive the expanded use of scientific surveys and standards for the interpretation
of such surveys. The ideas here are tentative; they need to be tested in a few
cases before being encased in new FTC rules. Nor would adoption of this
suggestion in all particulars itself significantly relieve the problems of delay
and ineffectiveness in FTC consumer protection cases. On the other hand,
sweeping condemnation of FTC personnel and procedure is no solution. What
is needed and what this article attempts is to examine critically one problem
area of FTC enforcement and to make specific suggestions which can be
tested, refined, and adopted as Commission rules.
II. FTC PROSCRIPTION OF FALSE ADVERTISEMENTS
14
A. Basic Issues in a False Advertising Case
The framework of a false advertising case is deceptively simple. In addi-
tion to satisfying elementary jurisdictional requirements-such as finding that
the advertisement was "in commerce," that the Commission's challenge is in
the "public interest," and that a "material" misrepresentation has occurred-
proof of a false advertising charge involves three substantive questions. First,
what did the respondent promise by its advertisement? That is, what con-
sumer understanding was created by the advertisement? Second, at what
level of consumer intelligence is the advertisement to be tested? Third, is the
promise of the advertisement as understood by the audience with this particular
intelligence true or false? If neither misleading nor false, no order is issued;
if otherwise, the challenged ad and similar practices are enjoined in perpetuity.
"Cf. Statement accompanying Trade Regulation Rule for the Prevention of Unfair and Deceptive
Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes, June 22, 1964, at 137, reprinted in Lemov, Administrative Agency
News Releases: Public Information Versus Private Inquiry, 37 GEo. WaSH. L. REv. 63, 76 n. 68 (1968);
Kauper, Cease and Desist: The History, Eflect, and Scope of Clayton Act Orders of the Federal Trade
Commission, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1095, 1210 (1968).
"8 Cf. Department of Defense Directive No. 1344.7, Personal Commercial Affairs (May 2, 1966), re-
printed in Hearings on S. 5 (Truth-in-Lending Act 1967) Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 243 (1967).
1 No attempt is made here to set forth the intricacies of Commission precedent and practice in false
advertising cases. Others have reviewed FTC false advertising law with care and length. See, e.g.,
Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 CoLmM. L. REv. 438 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as Millstein]; Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission: Decline of
Caveat Emptor, 24 Fa. B.J. 548 (1964); Developments in Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 1005 (1967); Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 CoLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1956). See also G.
ALEXANDEIR, HONESTY AND COMPETITION (1967). Rather, this section merely summarizes FTC false
advertising law and procedure in order to establish a basis for considering a survey proposal.
1969]
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Although this article concentrates on methods which are or can be used to
prove consumer understanding of a challenged advertisement, these techniques
are explainable only after the issues raised by the second and third questions,
i.e., the level of consumer intelligence and the truth of the representation,
have been explored briefly in context.
B. The Level of Consumer Intelligence and the Truth oj' the Claim
Little attention is paid in FTC hearings to the audience reached by the
advertisement and to the intelligence of that audience. This issue is generally
significant only upon court review of an FTC order. Even then, it has been
satisfied easily because the FTC is given almost unlimited discretion to deter-
mine what are unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Several factors contribute
to this result. As an administrative agency, the FTC is delegated the function
of determining what ads should be prohibited under ':he unfair or deceptive
standard; in this area courts are prone to defer to Commission expertise. In
addition the FTC need not show that consumers were actually deceived; it
need only prove that the ad has the capacity to deceive. Once a sufficient public
interest in prosecuting the matter has been found-again, a Commission deter-
mination seldom questioned by the courts-the FTC order generally is upheld
as long as it is possible that someone of "any intelligence level could find and
believe a misleading connotation.""
An extreme but commonly cited case illustrating his point is the FTC's
successful prosecution of a claim that a hair coloring product could "color hair
permanently."'" The Commission claimed that the respondent's use of the
term "permanent" was misleading since hair not yet grown when the product
was applied would still grow in with its natural color. But the Commission
did not show that anyone had been misled. Rather, it relied upon one con-
sumer's testimony that some women might misunderstand the ad as implying
that hair would subsequently grow in with the artifi ial color-even though
she herself knew better! In upholding the Commi:;sion's order the court
routinely noted that the advertisement could be prohibited because the FTC
Act is "for the protection of the trusting as well as the ,uspicious. ... ""
It is not surprising, then, that in the typical procee-ding neither the com-
plaint counsel nor the respondent dwell on the issue o? consumer intelligence.
This does not mean that the FTC has acted blindly and prohibited all adver-
tisements that may mislead someone. To be sure, it has banned ads which
seemingly could be misunderstood only by the "credulous" or "fools."" But
most of these cases can be explained on other grounds"9 or can be justified by
looking at the particular group to whom the ad is directed. ° Others can be
explained simply as time-worn cases of another day. Thus, in recent years the
1Millstein at 460.
"Gelb v. FTC, 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944).
"Id. at 5 82.
"See cases cited in G. ALEXANDER, supra note 14, at 8.
"See Developments in Law, supra note 14, at 1041 & n.18.
'See Millstein at 461-62 & n.98.
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Commission has refused to ban advertisements of a swimming aid worn under-
neath a bathing suit which was claimed to be "thin and invisible" when it liter-
ally was neither,"1 of charcoal briquets with a "Hickory-Kissed Flavor" even
though made from a corncob residue rather than wood," or of replacement
television tubes advertised as "new" when the "envelope" admittedly was made
with used glass.2
Reviewing courts will not uphold an FTC advertising ban unless there is
"substantial evidence" that the ad's claim is false or misleading. To prove his
case, complaint counsel must show (1) that the product or service is not as
effective as claimed and as understood by the hypothetical consumer at the
selected intelligence level, (2) that the product's performance is different from
the claim, or (3) that the claim cannot be verified. Where the complaint
counsel's assertions of deception are supported by expert testimony, trade wit-
nesses, or surveys (in cases of testimonial claims such as "twice as many
dentists prefer toothpaste X"),24 the Commission's order will not be disturbed.
C. Consumer Understanding
Where the meaning of a challenged advertisement is relatively clear, FTC
standards for assessing consumer comprehension of an ad are simple to apply.
The advertisement is viewed as a whole; it is tested by the general impression
it creates. Since ads are generally read quickly and carelessly, literal truth is
no defense to a charge of deception if a casual reading conveys a misleading
impression.
Advertisements underlying litigated cases are often ambiguous rather than
clear since they tend to convey both true and misleading claims. Here the
quest for a rational and workable measure of consumer understanding has
proved elusive. Where the misleading claim is likely to be dominant in the
mind of the consumer reading the advertisement, the ad is treated as if this
were the claim. But the central meaning may be less obvious. Secondary
meanings, qualifications, and limitations in the ad, as well as failures to dis-
close the whole truth, all contribute to the difficulty of ascertaining what the
consumer understands from an advertisement. In these situations current FTC
procedures do not satisfactorily resolve the issue of consumer understanding.
Part of the difficulty lies in the illogical division of the proof of consumer
deception into the twin issues of consumer intelligence, which is often re-
solved by considering that question in isolation without reference to the ad
itself, and consumer understanding of the attacked advertisement at that
intelligence level. It seems unrealistic to set the standard of consumer intelli-
1Heniz W. Kirchner, FTC Dkt. No. 8538 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,664
(1963).
'Quaker Oats Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8160 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,713
(1963).
'Compare Westinghouse Elec. Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8545 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. 16,497 (Initial Decision 1963), with id. 16,792 (Commission Opinion Dismissing Complaint
1964).
"See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 185 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950).
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gence without regard to the focus or placement of the advertisement. Until
this bifurcated analysis is rejected, the FTC should at least first determine the
actual, likely, and possible audience of the advertiseme-it and then determine
the intelligence level of this group. In other words, advertising aimed at
children, busy businessmen, or women fearful that they are pregnant should be
tested by a different standard than automobile ads dire-:ted at the public gen-
erally. In recent years the Commission has implicitly iecognized this point,"
but not as a standard procedure. However, even this modification of the usual
FTC approach to the problem of consumer deception does not explain why
the question of consumer intelligence is separated frora the question of con-
sumer understanding. Why should the Commission concern itself with the
level of consumer intelligence in deciding whether ar, advertisement should
be banned? Common sense would seem to suggest that the Commission deter-
mine the audience reached or likely to be reached by !the advertisement, and
then proceed to measure this audience's understanding of the representation
made by the ad without the intermediate and irrelevalat step of determining
the audience's intelligence.
Two unrelated events may explain the Commissior.'s methodology. First,
in reacting to early stringent judicial control over FTC advertising bans, later
reviewing courts may have leaned too far in the opposite direction in uphold-
ing Commission proscriptions of false advertising." Tie emphasis in judicial
opinions is thus on protecting the credulous, the trustir g, and even wayfaring
fools. But this only explains judicial reluctance to interf-re with an administra-
tive agency's fact determination; it does not justify FTC reliance on this irrele-
vant approach when the credulous are not shown to be i significant element in
an ad's audience.
Second, and perhaps more significant, has been the "evidence" or, more
accurately, the lack of evidence supporting FTC findi, gs of consumer under-
standing. The Commission's reliance on assumptions of consumer deception
appears unexplainable unless one accepts the view that administrative agencies
invariably select the route of least resistance. Althoug7h perhaps this is the
explanation, a more likely rationalization is that this approach to the issue of
consumer understanding is a by-product of the methods relied upon by counsel
to support findings of consumer understanding.
To prove his case the complaint counsel has several options.27 In most cases
he will present no evidence on the issue of consumer un Jerstanding and prefer-
ence and will argue instead that the FTC knows fronm its experience and ex-
pertise how consumers interpret respondent's labels and advertising. As an
. See cases cited in Developments in Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1041-42
nn.10-13 (1967).
' Nor have courts pressed the FTC to improve its fact-finding procedures. See, e.g., J. B. Williams
Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1967): "The Commission is not bound to the literal meaning
of the words, nor must the Commission take a random sample to determ ne the meaning and impact of
the advertisements."
'See, e.g., School Services, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8729, 3 TRADE REG. R P.. 18,576, at 20,906 (1968);
Quaker Oats Co., supra note 22.
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alternative to this intuitive or hunch approach, the complaint counsel may try
to avoid proving consumer understanding by transferring the burden to
respondent by seeking official notice of consumer understanding and prefer-
ence. Here the complaint counsel will rely on such factors as the obviousness
of the "fact" and prior similar FTC holdings. The complaint counsel may
point to dictionary definitions as indicating the meaning of advertising terms
and hence of public understanding. More directly, he can seek the testimony
of the purchasing public as to their understanding of the ad. Sometimes trade
experts are called upon to offer their understanding of consumer understand-
ing. Finally, a seldom used technique is the scientific survey which samples
the universe of consumers reached by the respondent's labels and advertise-
ments and ascertains consumer understanding and preference.2"
Despite this array of possible methods of proving consumer understanding,
complaint counsel generally rely on the intuitive approach, arguing that the
FTC has sufficient experience and expertise to know how consumers interpret
respondent's labels and ads. As one commentator concluded, "[G]enerally the
Commission will find that an advertisement promises what the Commission
itself believes it promises, notwithstanding dictionary definitions, the testimony
of consumers and experts, or the results of surveys."2" These practices have
continued in the face of mounting criticism. However, the implied suggestion
that the Commission should rely on such "evidence" as dictionary definitions,
consumer testimony or partisan surveys misconceives the defect of the intuitive
approach.
None of these methods for determining public deception is satisfactory.
Each has drawbacks which outweigh possible advantages when compared
with available or potential alternatives.
The intuitive or hunch method is an unsatisfactory explanation to the
respondent (and the public) of why an advertisement is unlawfully deceptive.
It encourages frequent and endless appeals. Although the FTC's judgment is
invariably upheld under this approach, the cost of party dissatisfaction, ad-
ministrative delay, and fruitless appellate contests makes it undesirable, except
where the deception is obvious or clear and any other method seems redundant
and wasteful.
Dictionary definitions serve no purpose other than for scoring argumenta-
tive points. As a tool for determining consumer understanding or deception
they are irrelevant and unreliable. A dictionary definition can tell what is a
possible or preferred interpretation of words in an advertisement, not how it
'Former hearsay objections to the admissibility of survey evidence have waned as standards for
survey administration and reliability have been developed and as the hearsay objection to evidence ad-
mitted in FTC hearings has been limited. Arrow Metal Prods. Corp., 53 FTC 721, 727, 733-34, aff'd per
cuam, 249 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1957); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 49 F.T.C. 263 (1952), afl'd, 208
F.2d 382, 386-87 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 940 (1955); see, e.g., Zeisel, The
Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 322 (1960); H. BARKSDALE, THE USE OF SURVEY RE-
SEARCH FINDINGS AS LEGAL EVIDENCE (1957).
uMillstein at 470.
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has, is, or will in fact be understood." Moreover, the ccntext of the advertise-
ment-verbally, textually, and visually-may even suggest a definition directly
contrary to that given in the dictionary.
Trade understandings likewise reflect a specialized view or historical fact
but do not necessarily suggest consumer understanding.
The consumer parade to the witness stand needlessly prolongs the hearing,
is likely to be inaccurate, and serves no purpose other than to demonstrate a
known fact-that somewhere, somehow it is possible for inventive counsel to
find someone who will interpret an advertisement as counsel wants. 1 Such
testimony provides no accurate clue-much less an indication--of consumer
understanding. There is no assurance that these witnesses reflect the views of
all or even a majority of consumers; they may just as well be isolated under-
standings or merely inconoclastic thoughts.
The Commission's practice of relying on official notice to establish con-
sumer understanding is useful only where the point is obvious or the identical
issue has been considered in other cases. Once the Commission has established
consumer preference and understanding in previous a lversary proceedings, it
is efficient and fair to presume that no change has occurred so long as the
respondent has an opportunity to prove either that the earlier finding was
erroneous or has no application in this case. If based on solid evidence, past
experience justifies this transfer of the burden of proof to respondent. But
the official notice method of establishing consumer 'inderstanding has very
limited applicability to FTC false advertising cases. It has commonly been
relied upon to show consumer preference for Ameri:an-made goods, except
in connection with perfumes and similar products, and for new as opposed to
'o Dr. Bergen Evans, Professor of English at Northwestern University, :onvinced a hearing examiner of
this point in one case: "In his testimony, Dr. Evans emphasized that dictionaries do not attempt to
dictate to the public how words should be used; rather, the function of a dictionary is simply to record
how words are in fact used by the public." Quaker Oats Co., FTC Dkt, 8160, p. 4 slip opinion (Initial
Decision 1962).
' Dr. Hans Zeisel, a Professor of Law and Sociology at the Universily of Chicago Law School, sum-
marized the defects of such "public testimony" in Quaker Oats:
The first requirement of a public opinion survey, he stated is that the persons interviewed must
constitute a representative sample of the public or the particular segment involved. They must be
chosen by lot or chance or some other method of "random" selectin. The second requirement
is that the interviews with the persons chosen must be unbiased, that is, disinterested.
Neither of these principles, Dr. Zeisel said, was followed here. The witnesses were offered only
because it was found by the respective parties that the individuals ettertained the views expressed
by them; there was no attempt at random sampling. Moreover, Dr, Zeisel stated, the interviews
with the individuals were not unbiased. The individuals were aware of the pending litigation, the
issue involved, and that their testimony was desired by the party interviewing them. In summary,
Dr. Zeisel testified, the testimony of the witnesses indicated nothing -nore than that the particular
individuals entertained the views expressed by them. The testimonr in his opinion afforded no
basis whatever for an inference that any substantial portion of the pu:lic entertained similar views.
Id. at 6-7. See also James S. Kirk & Co., 12 F.T.C. 272, 289 (1928] (criticism of testimony of 700
consumer witnesses). The Commission, however, still relies heavily uposi consumer witnesses. Consumer
Prods. of America, FTC Dkt. No. 8679, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,059, at 20,488-90 (1967), at'd, 400
F.2d 930 (3rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 877 (1969). See als r Waterbury, Opinion Surveys in
Civil Litigation, 44 TRADEMARK REP. 343, 347 (1954).
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reconditioned or used articles.32 In the vast majority of false advertising cases
involving claims of performance or price savings it has little relevance.
Least objectionable but still unsatisfactory is the reliance on partisan surveys
to demonstrate consumer understanding and deception or nondeception.
Properly prepared and conducted, a survey should indicate consumer under-
standing of particular advertising appeals. Requirements that survey "raw
data" be made available to opposing counsel and that the Commission accept
surveys only insofar as they are based on relevant questions may prevent un-
fairness or misuse of the survey. Until the FTC establishes sensible ground
rules for the preparation and presentation of surveys in cases where consumer
understanding is a significant issue, however, the partisan survey is an unduly
risky, expensive, and time-consuming method for one party to prove a single
issue in the case.3 Moreover, partisanship and accurate surveys are an un-
likely mixture."
III. NONPARTSIAN SURVEYS TO PROVE CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING 35
These objections to current techniques for proving consumer understanding
are not incurable. Consumer understanding of a challenged advertisement
need not remain a mystery to be resolved, if at all, only after lengthy and costly
proceedings. Instead, regularized procedures should be adopted to encourage
or require reliance on independent, nonpartisan surveys to establish consumer
understanding and to prove or disprove consumer deception. The survey
should be developed under the hearing examiner's guidance after consultation
'See, e.g., Delco Carpet Mills, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8692 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REat.
REP. 17,705 (Hearing Examiner Interlocutory Order 1966); Manco Watch Strap Co., 60 F.T.C. 495
(1962). But the scope of facts which can be "noticed" is limited. Compare Brite Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 347
F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1965), with Dayco Corp. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1966).
'The Commission has a penchant for relying upon respondent's survey evidence to support the
Commission's finding of consumer deception. In Rhodes Pharmacal, supra note 28, respondent's survey
was introduced to show that 91% of 300 surveyed consumers were not misled by advertisements of
Imdrin, a palliative for arthritis or rheumatism. Although unsatisfied with the questionnaire format, the
Commission relied upon the
survey [as] show[ing] that nine percent of those questioned stated that the advertisements repre-
sented that Imdrin would provide a treatment and cure for arthritis and rheumatism. This
number alone would constitute a sufficient showing of the deceptive nature of respondents'
advertisements. Upon this record the Commission is of the opinion that the hearing examiner
correctly held that respondents represented that Imdrin would provide a treatment and cure ...
49 F.T.C. at 283; accord, Benrus Watch Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7352 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. 16,541 (1963) (respondent's survey showing 86% of consumers surveyed properly under-
stood meaning of preticketing system relied upon by FTC to support finding of deception because 14%
of public misled).
S Surveyors notoriously find what they are hired to find. They can rarely tolerate the searchlight
of cross-examination. They can prove opposite results with equal ease. . . . Too often surveys
are conceived in darkness and strike only in the dark; too often they can accomplish nothing when
exposed. Generally, the wishes of those who hire surveyors become father to the surveyors'
findings.
This is why the' preferable and honest method of polling is under the direction of a court
through the submission of fair questions and propounded by the court in full consultation with
both sides. Under such conditions surveys can be useful.
United States v. General Motors Corp., 1967 Trade Cas. 72,229, at 84,463 (N.D. Ohio).
'A similar suggestion, in part, was proposed for judicial proceedings in Zeisel, The Uniqueness ol
Survey Evidence, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 322 (1960); accord, United States v. General Motors Corp., 1967
Trade Cas. 72,229 (N.D. Ohio). After describing the function and limits of survey evidence, Professor
Zeisel's attention was directed primarily to eliminating the hearsay objection to such evidence--which
should not be a concern in FTC hearings.
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with both complaint and respondent's counsel; the examiner would control
the materiality and relevance of particular questions and thus save the parties
the expense and embarrassment of useless evidence. Attractive as this sug-
gestion sounds, it will become only a tool for additional interlocutory appeals
and delay unless specific FTC rules set forth: (1) the type of case in which
such a prehearing survey is appropriate, (2) standards for survey administra-
tion and for drafting survey questions, and (3) criteria for measuring the sig-
nificance of these survey results. The examiner's rulings cannot be allowed to
be subject to the incessant and interminable interlocutory appeals so common
in Commission practice today. If these appeals are to be denied, however, the
rules or accompanying explanations must consider the basic issues involved.
A. The Hearing Examiner's Discretion
Just as FTC Rules now require a prehearing conference for exchange of
witness lists, documentary evidence, and similar matters to simplify and ex-
pedite the trial of FTC hearings, so should the Rules require that when the
question of consumer understanding is in issue in a false advertising case, the
examiner may, in his discretion, order that a survey be taken by an independent
expert, with the costs being assessed against the losing party or shared by the
FTC and respondent."0 However, such an order should not follow automati-
cally whenever a false advertising charge is filed and a complaint issued, since
the issue of consumer understanding or deception ma, not warrant the cost
or delay of an independent survey. Past cases involvirig identical facts may
have established the consumer understanding, in which case the official notice
technique considered earlier may be appropriate. Alsc, the blatant falsity of
the advertising may suggest that a survey is unnecessary . In other words, the
examiner must be allowed to exercise his discretion in ordering nonpartisan
surveys where the dispute regarding consumer understanding is not frivolous
and where its resolution would be aided by development of reliable survey
evidence.
'The cost of such a survey would probably not exceed $25,000 in most cases (depending upon the
range of error permitted).
The expense of conducting a national probability survey depends upon the absolute level of
misunderstanding which constitutes "deception" and the degree of certainty desired that the data
obtained establishes that the level has been reached. For example, if it were held that an ad-
vertisement would be considered unacceptable if it misled 15% of its readers, a sample of 1,275
consumers would be required to establish that an obtained 17% misleading level sufficiently ex-
ceeded (.05 confidence level) the upper 15% limit. A typical probatility sample will cost from$15 to $20 per person included in the sample. Telephone interview with William Green, Gallup
& Robinson, Princeton, N.J., Feb. 9, 1967.
Developments in Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1(177 n.120 (1967). The cost of
most false advertising cases to each party far exceeds this sum. See, e.g., 1,4ote, The Federal Trade Com-
mission and Relorm ot the Administrative Process, 62 COLUM. L. REv. (71, 704 (1962) (cost of legal
fees of a settlement negotiation with FTC may exceed $25,000; trial coss of an antitrust action before
the FTC, exclusive of record, often runs $175,000); Howrey, The Federal Trade Commission-Present
Problems and Suggested Changes, 10 ABA ANTITRUST SEcTioN 40, 46 (1S57). Thus, reliance on surveys
could substantially reduce the current cost of many false advertising cases--if the Commission also estab-
lished (as suggested below) standards, and subsequently, threshold lim ts of consumer deception. In
other words, once the survey is taken, the case will often be ready for I gal argument and not require
extensive and expensive trial proceedings.
'See, e.g., Stanley Labs., Inc. v. FTC, 138 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1943).
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Despite the desirability of a Rule change requiring surveys where appro-
priate, it is arguable that hearing examiners need not await this development
before ordering nonpartisan surveys. Examiners may have the power to direct
consumer surveys under FTC Rule § 3.21(a), which authorizes prehearing
conferences to consider, among other things, "Such other matters as may aid
in the orderly and expeditious disposition of the proceeding, .... ."" In addi-
tion, an examiner could rely on his authority to conduct adjudicatory hear-
ings, which includes the duty and power "to take all necessary action to avoid
delay in the disposition of [the] proceedings...
B. Administration of the Survey4"
If the third-party survey is to resolve the issue of consumer understanding,
the examiner will have to exercise direction over the development of the
survey questionnaire and the sample selection. The parties must be allowed to
challenge the survey technique and results. The survey expert should, of
course, prepare the exact format of the questions to insure that the desired
information is elicited without incorporating an unwanted bias into the results.
But these questions should be developed by the expert, with the guidance of
the examiner, only after extensive consultation with the parties to determine
the general questions to be asked and the consumer understanding to be
probed.
The advantage of having the parties and the examiner involved in
the initial preparation is obvious. Any objections can be raised at the time
when the questions can still be modified; failure to do so should be a waiver
of such objections. Moreover, the examiner can rule immediately on the
materiality and relevance of the questions, a function already assigned the
examiner as part of the FTC's prehearing conference procedure. The cost of
useless or unusable surveys is also avoided.
On the other hand, the disadvantage that an erroneous ruling by an ex-
aminer may result in an irrelevant survey does not justify allowing interlocu-
tory appeals from such rulings. The FTC's substantial existing precedents
' 16 C.F.R. S 3.21(a) (6) (1968).
'FTC Procedures & Rules of Practice § 3.42(c), 16 C.F.R. S 3.42(c) (1968).
" Professor Zeisel has suggested several safeguards:
(1) All sampling plans, instructions to field workers, questionnaires and other survey instruments
ought to be available as evidence of its design.(2) The survey staff, from the director down to the ultimate field workers, should be available for
questioning as to the survey's manner of execution. The survey interviewees, as a rule, ought
not to be required to testify.(3) The survey evidence should be presented by an expert witness.
(4) If a survey is planned during the course of the litigation, the court should explore the possibility
of having the survey conducted by stipulation of parties through an agreed-upon or court ap-
pointed impartial expert. At that time, such technical requirements as size of sample and other
specifications could also be stipulated. If this should not prove feasible, a litigant intending to
offer a survey in evidence should be required to notify his opponent early enough to enable him
to become an observer in its development. If the survey was completed prior to the commence-
ment of the litigation, it should be disclosed to the adversary well in advance of the trial.
Zeisel, supra note 35, at 345-46. See also H. ZEISEL, SAY IT WITH FIGURES (4th ed. 1957); H. BARKS-
DALE, supra note 28; H. HYMAN, SURVEY DESIGN AND ANALYSIS (1955); M. JAHODA, RESEARCH METHODS
IN SocltAL RELATIONS (1951); M. PARTEN, SURVEYS, POLLS AND SAMPLES (1950); Sorenson & Sorenson,
The Admissibility, and Use of Opinion Research Evidence, 28 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1213 (1953).
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detailing relevant consumer understanding in false advertising cases are
sufficient guidance to reduce the likelihood of such error; the cost of delay
from interlocutory appeals also outweighs the advantages of obtaining Com-
mission guidance at this point. However, especially in the early cases tried
under this procedure, the examiner can avoid such problems by ruling, when
feasible, that questions sought to be included by only ore of the parties should
also be part of the survey questionnaire.
Although the survey expert should be the one to decide the appropriate
manner of taking the survey and the statistical method for selecting the sample,
the question of who should be included in the universe, of those sampled also
involves a critical legal issue that must be decided in advance of the study.
All possible problems cannot be anticipated. Nevertheless, it seems likely that
most disputes here will revolve around whether the sample should be limited
to those (1) who were reached by the advertisement, (2) to whom it was
directed, or (3) who might be reached by the ad. It could also be argued that
the universe should include only (4) those whom the advertisement reached
who also purchased the product or (5) those most likely to be deceived as a
result of background, training, or experience who are also in the group who
might be reached. The cautious approach would be to include in the universe
sufficient numbers so that valid subsamples could be taken of each of these
subgroups. Where cost is not prohibitive this may be appropriate. Current
FTC decisions in false advertising cases, and common sense, suggest that the
proper sample should include those who were in faci: or were likely to be
reached by the challenged advertisement.
This procedure does not guarantee the admissibility of the survey into evi-
dence. The raw data of the survey must be available to the parties in advance
of the hearing. Unless stipulated as an exhibit by both parties, the survey
should be presented by its director to establish the vdidity of the question
format, the interviewing technique, the sample selected, and the mathematical
support for the range of error suggested.4' Supporting survey personnel must
also be available for cross-examination. Once it is established that the'survey
technique and sample are valid, the survey should become part of the record
and should serve as support for findings of consumer understanding.
C. Interpretation of Survey Findings
Admitting the survey into the record does not solve all problems. Still to
be decided are: What do the survey findings mean? How should they be
used? Has the survey established that the consumer was or is likely to be de-
'See United States v. General Motors Corp., 1967 Trade Cas. 72,229, at 84,462 (N.D. Ohio):
Defendant will be entitled to test the accuracy of the surveys and to demonstrate the respects
in which it deems the surveys to be faulty. In order for defendant to do this, it must have an
opportunity to determine and demonstrate to the Court exactly how, and under what circumstances,
the survey questions were formulated and the survey was carried out. ... [T]he only fair
avenue of defense open to the defendant is a full attack on the composition of the Government's
survey. This avenue cannot be, and will not be, constricted by the Covernment's refusal to dis-
close the architectural and constructive details of its survey.
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ceived by the respondent's advertising? Does the ad meet current standards of
acceptable advertising honesty?
First, reliance on nonpartisan surveys should mean that all other evidence
of consumer understanding is redundant and excludable. Once the survey is
introduced the hearing should proceed quickly to the legal issues involved or
to a consideration of the other substantive issue, whether the representation
is true.
Second, the survey will establish whether any consumers either have been
or are likely to be deceived by the advertisement as well as the approximate
number in each category. Deception of a sufficient number of consumers will
satisfy the "public interest" or "materiality" requirements of prosecutions
under section 5 of the FTC Act.
Third, a properly conducted survey will indicate not only the number but
also the significance of the deception resulting from the respondent's advertise-
ment. It will show not only the raw numbers and the per cent of the sample
who were deceived but also the extent or basis of their deception. This latter
demonstration-the scope and significance of the consumer misunderstanding
-should control Commission use of survey findings.
In preparing this article, it was first thought that the best approach would
be to suggest a basic standard for consumer deception. For example, in Benrus
Watch Co., 2 the respondent's consumer survey demonstrated that eighty-six
per cent of the public properly understood the meaning of its preticketing
system but that fourteen per cent were misled by it. The Commission relied
on this survey to find deception on the ground that fourteen per cent was too
much. One might conclude from this case that an advertisement which mis-
leads fourteen per cent of the public is deceptive and will be prohibited. Then
the only questions are whether one is satisfied with this standard and whether
the respondent's advertisement falls under it. The practical result is to establish
a per se rule of consumer deception analogous to the horizontal and vertical
merger rules extant today.
The difficulty with this suggestion, and the reason it is not urged here, is
that FTC experience with consumer surveys is too limited to justify reliance
upon set figures as demonstrating sufficient deception for a false advertising
charge without permitting rebuttal evidence or argument. Nor is this difficulty
avoided by ruling that the standards create only a rebuttable presumption.
This approach accomplishes little except to add pages to the parties' briefs. In
addition to treating the survey as just another item of evidence supporting or
rejecting certain inferences, the presumption approach merely adds another
step in the analysis. A more significant defect in the per se and presumption
approaches is their inability to account for and respond flexibly to the varieties
of harm resulting from different kinds of deceptive advertising. The scope and
significance of the harm should affect the level at which the threshold of
prohibited deception is established. Where the challenged deceptive practice
"FTC Dkt. No. 7352 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,541 (1963).
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involves consumer health or safety, it seems clear that almost any deception
(one per cent or two per cent, certainly not more than five per cent) will justify
issuance of a cease and desist order unless the impact is trivial or insignificant.
On the other hand, economic harm such as that resulting from misleading
modeling or dancing school advertisements, inaccurate product or firm descrip-
tions, or undesirable sales promotions is less serious and these cases would
justify an order only after substantial consumer deception such as ten per cent
or fifteen per cent was shown. By comparison, commercial harm cases, which
often masquerade as consumer harm cases, such as those involving disclosure
of a product's foreign origins or of whether charcoal briquets are manufac-
tured from a wood or corncob base, would seem to require a survey finding that
thirty per cent or forty per cent of the consumers in the appropriate universe
were deceived by the respondent's advertisement.
This brief analysis suggests only a rough approximation of where possible
standards should be set for evaluating consumer surveys. The need for a
flexible rather than an automatic analysis of such findings seems apparent. It
also suggests several factors that the Commission should consider when eval-
uating consumer surveys and when determining whether a cease and desist
order is justified. They include:
1. What is the type of harm resulting from or affected by the deceptive advertising?
Does it involve consumer health or safety, his economic status, or each of these?
2. Who are those most likely to be deceived or harmed by the deceptive advertising?
Are they consumers or business competitors? Or, are they likely to be low, middle,
or upper level income consumers? Or, are they likely to be small, independent
businessmen or one of the corporate giants?
3. How substantial is the harm likely to be? In addition to the impact of the responses
to the first two categories mentioned, this factor involves such questions as: How
many consumers are (or are likely to be) affected by this advertising? What is
the size of the typical purchase made as a result of the ch.llenged advertisement?
How significant was the promise in the advertisement :o the making of the
purchase?
4. Is a separate public interest and harm involved in addition to the individual harm
noted above? For example, does the advertisement encourage the sale of an ex-
pensive and unneeded encyclopedia, and is it likely that the purchasing consumer
will become subject to garnishment or similar proceedings?
5. What is respondent's culpability? Is the deception a resilt of misstatement of
facts, nondisclosure of relevant information, or part of a pattern of deceptive
practices?
These suggested factors obviously do no exhaust the field; nor will they neces-
sarily govern every case. Hopefully, they do offer a rational basis for evaluating
and applying survey findings of consumer understanding when determining
whether a challenged advertisement should be prohibited or permitted.
[Vol. 17
